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Aristotle on Natural Slavery: An Analysis Using 
the Marxist Concept of Ideology
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ABSTRACT: Aristotle’s account of natural slavery as presented in 
his Politics is often treated by historians of philosophy as an account 
that can be analyzed purely internally in terms of its argumentative 
structure without referring to social factors. Against this view, Aristo-
tle’s account of natural slavery is seen to be ideological according to 
at least one variant of the Marxist concept of ideology, and cannot 
be understood without reference to Aristotle’s socioeconomic con-
text. The ideological nature of Aristotle’s account of natural slavery 
is especially evident in his “proto-racialization” of the category of 
the “natural slave.” The Marxist concept of ideology is demonstra-
bly useful in the historical study of philosophy, as compared with 
internalist historians of philosophy who claim that referring to non-
philosophical factors such as class interests inevitably obscures the 
philosophical content of the texts that are the objects of analysis.
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, ideology, sociology of philosophy, slavery, 
Greek philosophy
1. Introduction
THE CENTRAL INTERPRETATIVE THESIS of this essay is that Aristotle’s account of natural slavery as presented in the Politics is ideological in character, in the Marxist sense. The main aim 
of this paper is to show that at least one variant of the Marxist concept 
* I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers and referees for Science & Society for their incisive 
and helpful comments on the content of this article. I also gratefully acknowledge Mark 
Johnstone’s helpful comments on early versions of this paper.
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of ideology can be successfully utilized in the study and interpretation 
of some cases in the history of philosophy. In other words, the interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s account of natural slavery is treated as a case study. 
Since there are several variants of the Marxist concept of ideology, it is 
important to explicitly specify the variant that I will be employing. In 
this discussion I will be employing Richard W. Miller’s interpretation of 
Marx’s conception of ideology. I do so because Miller’s account seems 
to provide a concept of ideology that is promising in relation to the 
development of a materialist approach to the history of philosophy.1 
According to Miller, the concept of ideology was introduced by Marx 
and Engels in order to answer the following question: “Why have so 
many socially important ideas distorted reality when available data, 
reasonable inference and the state of science dictated no correspond-
ing mistake?” (Miller, 1984, 46). On this reading, an ideology would 
be a claim or set of claims that “distort reality and that result from 
social forces, characteristic of class societies, having no tendency to 
bring ideas in line with reality” (Miller, 1984, 45).2 In other words, 
a claim (or account) is to be regarded as ideological if and only if it 
is so evidently false that the only way in which we can explain why it 
is held is to appeal to its function in upholding the interests of the 
dominant group or class in the society in question. I have chosen to 
employ this variant of the Marxist concept of ideology because I am 
primarily concerned with the explicit (and evidently false) claims 
that Aristotle makes about who counts as a natural slave. The concept 
of ideology that I am employing is charitable insofar as the evident 
falsehood of the belief in question is to be evaluated relative to the 
evidence that was available to the thinker who held the belief that is 
under examination. Hence, if Aristotle’s account of natural slavery is 
to be accurately described as being ideological in character we have 
to show that, for instance, his belief that non-Greeks were natural 
slaves (i.e., lacked the ability to deliberate) was evidently false when 
1 I do not deny that there is a vast and interesting literature on Marxist conceptions of ideol-
ogy, nor do I wish to suggest that Marxist accounts of ideology that are different from the 
one that is being employed here are not valuable. My primary concern here is to show that 
at least one variant of the Marxist concept of ideology can be fruitfully employed in interpre-
tive analysis of cases in the history of philosophy.
2 Miller, despite working within the so-called “analytical Marxism” tradition, essentially con-
verges with Althusser’s account of ideology. For both agree that “ideology represents the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1971, 
162). The point is that this account of the concept of ideology should not be seen as exclusive 
to so-called “analytical Marxism.”
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evaluated against the empirical evidence that was available to him. 
The concept of ideology that I am employing sets the bar relatively 
high for what can count as an ideological claim. According to my use 
of the concept of ideology, even if a certain claim is both false and 
supports the interests of the ruling class or group in a given society, it 
cannot be counted as ideological if its falsehood is not evident when 
evaluated against the evidence that was available to the individual who 
advanced it. The point of working with a concept of ideology that sets 
a high bar for what counts as ideology is to counter the criticisms of 
classicists and scholars of ancient Greek philosophy such as Malcolm 
Heath, who argues that describing Aristotle’s account of natural slav-
ery as ideological is too easy for it to have much point (Heath, 2008, 
244). The function of the concept of ideology is precisely to provide 
an explanation of otherwise unexplainable errors by referring to the 
relevant social structures and interests.
The justification for using the concept of ideology when engaging 
in historical studies in philosophy is its explanatory power; it allows 
us to answer questions such as: How can someone as intelligent as 
Aristotle hold beliefs which seem to be so evidently false, even when 
we account for the evidence that he had access to? The importance 
of the criterion of blatant falsehood is apparent here, since we are 
discussing cases where the falsehood of the belief in question is so 
blatant that resorting to the claim that it is the product of innocent 
mistakes in philosophical reasoning is unlikely to be an adequate 
explanation. In other words, the concept of ideology with its refer-
ence to social interests and social struggles as explanatory factors can 
offer explanations precisely where the explanatory power of purely 
internalist accounts of the history of philosophy breaks down. A purely 
internalist account that attempts to explain developments in the his-
tory of philosophy by only referring to “philosophical reasons and 
considerations” (Normore, 1990, 38) would not be able to explain 
cases like Aristotle’s account of natural slavery.
This commitment to internalism, which is simply declared by 
decree to be the only valid approach to studying the history of phi-
losophy, is reflected in the manner in which scholars of Aristotle have 
dealt with Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery. Malcolm Schofield, to 
give one representative example, thinks that Aristotle’s theoretical 
claims about natural slavery essentially have nothing to do with slavery 
as it existed in the Athenian society in which he lived. He essentially 
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attempts to insulate the theory against the charge of ideology by claim-
ing that “the false consciousness gets to work when Aristotle stops 
theorizing” (Schofield, 1999, 116). However, the difficulty with this 
view is that it requires us to believe that a philosopher who lived in a 
slave society (and not just a society with slaves), and who owned slaves 
himself, developed his views on slavery without being at all influenced 
by actually existing practices of slavery, and without being interested 
in describing them and providing them with legitimation. Schofield’s 
attempt at separating the theoretical elements from the empirical 
claims that Aristotle makes in his account of natural slavery provides 
a clear example of what I take to be an unreasonable methodological 
assumption, namely, the assumption that theoretical claims can arise 
without having any points of contact with the socio-historical context 
of the thinker who advanced them.
Unlike Schofield, I will be arguing that an examination of Aristo-
tle’s account of natural slavery in its socio-historical context, i.e., one 
that acknowledges its points of contact with contemporary slavery 
in Athens and contemporary Greek attitudes towards non-Greeks, is 
more fruitful (for understanding Aristotle’s own account) than an 
account that presupposes that Aristotle thought that his account of 
natural slavery had no points of contact with contemporary slavery in 
Athens.3 My main argument for the thesis that Aristotle’s account of 
natural slavery is ideological in character is that Aristotle does not seem 
to be treating the question of whether there are in fact any humans 
in existence who can be correctly described as “natural slaves” as an 
open question. I argue that this is connected to what I will describe as 
Aristotle’s “proto-racialization” of natural slavery. I think it should be 
clear that one cannot hope to establish the ideological character of 
Aristotle’s account of natural slavery with certainty; hence, my aim is 
only to establish my claim with a high degree of plausibility. In doing 
so, I will attempt to defend the utility of employing the concept of 
ideology, in the Marxist sense, in the study of the history of philoso-
phy (i.e., to defend the claim that in at least some cases utilizing a 
variant of the Marxist concept of ideology is helpful to the historian 
of philosophy). In order to do so successfully, I will attempt to bring 
to the fore the conceptual contradictions that Aristotle faces in his 
3 Paul Millett (correctly) notes that Aristotle’s views on non-Greeks “represented a reality of 
Athenian slavery” (Millett, 2007, 194). However, he does not attempt to relate this fact to 
the logical structure of Aristotle’s argument.
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attempt to defend his theory of natural slavery. While I will try to bring 
in the relevant social factors whenever possible, I intend to focus on 
the conceptual issues that Aristotle faces because I wish to respond 
to a common criticism that is raised by philosophers against the use 
of variants of the Marxist concept of ideology, namely that those who 
employ concepts of ideology tend to ignore the logical structure of 
the philosophical position that is being studied. For example, Eugene 
Kamenka has argued that when Marxist historians of philosophy try 
to analyze Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery through the prism of 
ideology they tend to ignore his “logical concerns” (Kamenka, 1965, 
103). I will try to show that, far from ignoring the “logical concerns” 
of Aristotle’s account of natural slavery, employing a variant of the 
Marxist concept of ideology helps us explain its logical structure.
I will emphasize that, since it is not reasonable to expect that 
philosophy (when carried out in good faith) will completely emanci-
pate us from all  the prejudices of our culture and society (and of our 
class, gender, and ethnic group), we should have realistic measures 
for what would have counted as a philosophically informed and suc-
cessful engagement with slavery (i.e., one that recognizes its injustice) 
in Aristotle’s own historical context. To this end, I will point out the 
various alternative views on slavery and non-Greeks that were advanced 
by some of Aristotle’s contemporaries, in order to provide a realis-
tic measure of the range of views that were in principle available to 
Aristotle. I will argue that Aristotle had access to evidence (some of 
which can be found in the text of the Politics  itself) that would have 
led him to question, at a minimum, his apparent endorsement of the 
claim that all non-Greeks are natural slaves, had he not been in the 
grip of an ideology which served to protect the material interests of 
slave-owning Greeks.4 I should explicitly note that throughout this 
discussion I will be taking it for granted that a successful philosophical 
engagement with slavery would have recognized its injustice.5 Nonethe-
less, it is important to note that while we do know that some thinkers 
4 I say “apparent endorsement” because, initially, in Chapter 2 of Book I of the Politics, Aristotle 
does not directly say that all non-Greeks are natural slaves, but he does seem to approve of 
the line that he quotes from Euripides’ Iphigenia in Aulis: “it is proper for Greeks to rule non-
Greeks” (1252b7–9). As we shall see, he does seem to actively endorse this claim throughout 
the Politics.
5 Note, however, that I am not assuming that a philosophical engagement with slavery that is 
unsuccessful is by virtue of that fact ideological in character (for that would be to beg the 
question).
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in antiquity recognized that slavery as such was unjust, none of them 
took the additional step of calling for its abolition (Garnsey, 1996, 64; 
Vidal-Naquet, 1986, 173). Hence, if we are to judge Aristotle’s account 
within its historical context, it might be reasonable to suppose that he 
might have recognized the injustice of slavery as such, but it is unrea-
sonable to expect him to have called for its abolition. Hence, I will be 
focusing on the former issue.
Here, I want to make a final, brief methodological point. It seems 
to me that some interpreters of Aristotle have underestimated the 
importance of paying attention to the human capacity to compart-
mentalize, i.e., our ability to be rational when dealing with one set of 
issues while being completely irrational when dealing with another set. 
For instance, Richard Kraut’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account of 
natural slavery depends on this assumption: “One cannot talk oneself 
into believing anything whatsoever, however absurd, and however 
much it conflicts with appearances — even if one might, by doing 
so, realize one’s fondest dreams” (Kraut, 2002, 279). In my opinion, 
this assumption is patently false, and it begs the question against the 
possibility of the successful employment of the concept of ideology as 
an explanatory tool, since it essentially amounts to a rejection, with-
out argument, of the possibility of employing strong cognitive bias, 
conditioned by one’s socioeconomic position and other factors, as 
an explanatory factor when studying the history of philosophy (with 
the specific aim of understanding why the thinker in question held 
the view that we are examining). The basic (and to my mind, entirely 
defensible) presupposition of my approach is that, under some circum-
stances, cognitive bias (conditioned by one’s socioeconomic position 
and one’s consciousness of belonging to a “superior” ethnic group) 
can become so strong that it prevents the thinker in question from 
recognizing facts that an unbiased observer would have recognized. 
As Frantz Fanon pointed out:
Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are 
presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence can-
not be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, 
called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the 
core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that does 
not fit in with the core belief. (Fanon, 1967, 194.)6
6 Karl Mannheim also makes a similar point (Mannheim, 1960, 36).
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2. The Need for an Enslaved Population in Aristotle’s Ideal Polity
In Chapter 5 of Book I of the Politics Aristotle makes it seem that 
he is treating the question of natural slavery (i.e., whether there actually 
exist people for whom enslavement would be just) as an open question: 
“But whether anyone is really like that by nature or not, and whether it 
is better or just for anyone to be a slave or not (all slavery being against 
nature) — these are the things we must investigate next” (1254b18–19). 
First, I should clarify what I mean by an “open question.” I simply mean 
that if Aristotle is treating the existence of people who satisfy the condi-
tions for natural slavery (i.e., enslavement that is just and beneficial for 
them) as an open question, he is, in principle, open to the possibility 
of it not being the case that there are any such people in existence. 
Now, if we can show that Aristotle could not have treated the question 
of natural slavery as an open question, and that what he presents as an 
unbiased philosophical inquiry that leads to the conclusion that “there 
are some people, some of whom are naturally free, others naturally 
slaves, for whom slavery is both just and beneficial” (1255a1–2), is in 
fact a rationalization of a conclusion that he was already committed to, 
then we have strong evidence to support the thesis that his account of 
natural slavery is ideological in character.
The argument is fairly straightforward. If Aristotle believed that 
the ideal constitution, or even a non-ideal but desirable one (relative 
to the existing situation),7 requires slavery in order to function as 
the mode of political and social organization within which the adult 
male citizens can cultivate their virtue and flourish (and for Aristo-
tle, this seems to follow from the fact that the cultivation of virtue 
requires leisure, which in turn means that the polis requires slaves in 
order to provide the necessities of life for the adult male citizens of 
the polis so that the latter do not have to engage in physical labor), 
and if the ideal constitution (or the non-ideal, but desirable one) is 
just, then it follows that there has to be a form of slavery that is just, 
if the ideal constitution (or the non-ideal, but desirable one) is to be 
actualizable.8 No one, I think, would dispute that Aristotle thought 
that his ideal polis in Book VII requires people whose manual labor 
would provide the citizens with the necessities of life. Aristotle himself 
7 I.e., the practical ideal which he refers to as a “polity.”
8 Note that I will be focusing on the ideal polis that is described in Books VII and VIII.
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is quite explicit about this: “Nor should those who are going to be 
citizens engage in farming, since leisure is needed both to develop 
virtue and to engage in political actions” (1329a1–3). Aristotle goes 
on to claim that, in the ideal polis, “the farmers must be either slaves 
or non-Greek subject peoples” (1329a25–26). When Aristotle says 
this he seems to have in mind a population of communally owned 
slaves (i.e., a Helot-like population). We can see clearly that Aristotle 
is committed to there being a large population of individuals whose 
enslavement is just.9 Aristotle himself seems to have been aware of 
this issue when he says: “If each tool could perform its tasks on com-
mand or by anticipating instructions, and if . . . shuttles wove cloth by 
themselves, and picks played the lyre, a master craftsman would not 
need assistants, and masters would not need slaves” (1253b33–39). 
Aristotle’s account replicates, at the level of philosophical discourse, 
the need for slavery which sustained the social formation of classical 
Athens. In fact, Aristotle’s reference to domestic labor in the passage 
quoted above is rather revealing because while slaves were utilized in 
agriculture, and in silver mines, domestic slaves comprised the most 
numerous category of slaves in classical Athens (Fischer, 2003, 53). 
Domestic slaves were responsible for carrying out household labor 
and for wool-making and cloth-making.
3. Aristotle’s Account of the Psychological Constitution 
of the “Natural Slave”
On Aristotle’s account someone who is a natural slave lacks “the 
deliberative part of the soul” (1260a11–13) and hence is incapable 
of rational foresight. There is debate in the secondary literature over 
what kind of deliberation the natural slave is supposed to be incapable 
of. Pierre Pellegrin argues that when Aristotle denies that the natural 
slave has the ability to deliberate, he is not denying that the natural 
slave can be intelligent (in the instrumental sense); instead, he is claim-
ing that the natural slave is unable to engage in ethical deliberation. I 
think that Pellegrin’s motivations for his view are understandable, as 
he clearly recognizes that “Aristotle was not unaware of the scientific 
and technical accomplishments of certain barbarian [i.e., non-Greek] 
9 It is true that this form of enslavement is different from chattel slavery. On the other hand, chattel 
slavery is only one form of enslavement. The Helots, for instance, were not enslaved as individuals 
to individual masters, but were rather enslaved collectively to the state (Cartledge, 2003).
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peoples” (Pellegrin, 2013, 107). However, it seems to me that Pellegrin’s 
view cannot be correct: when Aristotle discusses what makes a person 
a natural master (as opposed to a natural slave) he makes reference 
to “rational foresight” without qualifying it as rational foresight associ-
ated with deliberation about ethical ends: “For if something is capable 
of rational foresight, it is a natural ruler and master, whereas whatever 
can use its body to labor is ruled and is a natural slave” (1252a31–34). 
I take it that when Aristotle is claiming that “whatever can use its body 
to labor is ruled” he is really claiming that whatever (or whoever) can 
only use his/her body to labor is only fit to be ruled. For Aristotle does 
not seriously claim that those who are not natural slaves are somehow 
constitutively unable to use their bodies to labor.10 However, we should 
also understand that Aristotle when trying to emphasize the identity of 
slaves with physical activity is essentially trying to rationalize the modes 
of discourse that were employed by Athenian slave owners (like himself) 
who would frequently refer to a slave simply as a soma, literally a body.11
It is indeed true that Aristotle initially attempts to claim that 
natural slaves have bodies that are suited for labor while naturally 
free individuals have bodies that make them unable to engage in 
labor (1254b25–27). However, he quickly abandons this approach as 
he recognizes that “the opposite often happens as well: some have 
the bodies of free men, others, the souls” (1254b31), and he ends 
up emphasizing that the distinction has to do with deficiencies in the 
natural slave’s soul. The point is that, in the sentence that has been 
quoted above (1252a31–34), Aristotle does not claim that the natural 
slave lacks the capacity to engage in ethical deliberation; instead, he 
seems to be quite clearly claiming that the natural slave lacks rational 
foresight in the general sense (i.e., that someone who is a natural slave 
is unable to engage in high level intellectual activity in general).12
10 Aristotle clearly suggests that those who are naturally free are capable of performing the 
tasks that are only appropriate for slaves, so it is not as if they (i.e., those who are naturally 
free) are constitutively incapable of performing them (1333a6–10).
11 For the terms that were used by the Greeks to refer to slaves, see Fischer, 2003, 6–7.
12 My view is fairly close to Kraut’s view on this issue, i.e., that Aristotle thought that the natural 
slave “lacks both the capacity to engage in that context-sensitive and creative adjustment of 
means to ends that Aristotle calls deliberation” (Kraut, 2002, 301). Joseph M. Bryant also 
reads Aristotle as claiming that natural slaves lack the ability to deliberate in general (Bryant, 
1996). So does Ward (2002). Bryant provides additional support for my claim that Aristotle’s 
account of natural slavery is ideological when he notes that Aristotle’s claim that natural 
slaves are incapable of deliberation “is a form of intraspecies differentiation that finds no 
parallel in his biological studies of other species” (Bryant, 1996, 363).
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We should also note that Aristotle’s own account of the justification 
for the different relations of rule does not justify the conclusion that 
natural slaves ought to be ruled in a despotic manner (1260a5–15). 
As Nicholas D. Smith has noted, “the potentiality of the thing ruled 
does not seem to be an important ingredient in Aristotle’s distinc-
tions of the proper sorts of rule” (Smith, 1983, 117). For on Aristotle’s 
account, reason ought to rule emotion (or desire) in a kingly manner 
(analogous to the rule exercised by the father over his children), but 
emotion, even though it perceives reason and responds to it, does 
not have the potential to be rational (to possess reason). Yet Aristotle 
thinks that emotion (or desire) should be ruled by reason in a kingly 
(or paternalistic) manner: “the soul rules the body with the rule of a 
master, whereas understanding rules desire with the rule of a states-
man or with the rule of a king” (1254b4–6). Aristotle characterizes the 
natural slave as “he who shares in reason to the extent of understanding 
it, but does not have it himself” (1254b21–22). Hence it would seem 
that the proper rule for the natural slave is the sort of rule that is exer-
cised by reason over emotion (i.e., kingly rule), rather than the sort of 
rule that is exercised by the soul over the body (i.e., despotic rule).13 
It is therefore not clear that Aristotle has any adequate philosophi-
cal argument, even on his own terms, for thinking that natural slaves 
ought to be ruled in a despotic manner. Thus, at least on this point, 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Aristotle’s claim that natural 
slaves ought to be ruled despotically is anything other than an attempt 
to provide justification for the manner in which slaves were actually 
ruled in Athens. Hence, it is difficult to hold the view that Aristotle 
was not at all concerned with the actual institution of slavery when he 
was providing an account of natural slavery. We should also note that 
Aristotle cannot avoid this dilemma by claiming that natural slaves have 
no share in reason whatsoever (i.e., that they are not even responsive 
to reason) because if he did that, he would in effect be claiming that 
they are not even human; however, he clearly recognized that “slaves 
are human and have a share in reason” (1259b27–28).
We can see, from the argument that I have presented above, 
that Aristotle’s political philosophy as a whole (as he seems to have 
understood it) requires not only that a theoretical account of natural 
slaves should be specifiable, but also that there should be people in 
13 Robert Schlaifer also makes this point (Schlaifer, 1936, 195).
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existence whose enslavement would be just, if the ideal constitution 
(or even a polity) is to be actualizable. Here, I think it is important to 
note that Schofield’s account of the role that natural slavery in Book 
I plays in Aristotle’s overall project in the Politics  is rather one-sided 
(Schofield, 1999, 112–115). I agree with Schofield that one of Aristo-
tle’s main aims in his discussion of slavery in Book I is to distinguish 
among different kinds of rule. However, Aristotle is also concerned 
with establishing that there are in fact natural slaves, since the ideal 
polis of Books VII and VIII requires that there be natural slaves. In fact, 
given that Aristotle’s polis  is a slave society (and not just a society with 
slaves),14 Aristotle (insofar as he believed that his prescriptions were 
actualizable, and presumably he believed this, if he criticized what we 
can call Plato’s “utopianism” for being too impractical and advanced 
his own prescriptions as being far more practical than Plato’s) requires 
that there be a substantial number of people whose enslavement is 
just. If this is the case, then we have some evidence to support the 
view that Aristotle’s account of natural slavery is ideological, at least 
insofar as it is a rationalization of an utterly false conclusion (i.e., that 
there is a large number of people for whom slavery is both just and 
beneficial) that he needs in order for his project to be viable. How-
ever, this evidence is not yet sufficient, for it is clear that showing that 
Aristotle needed a large number of people to be natural slaves for 
his normative political account to work is not sufficient evidence for 
claiming that Aristotle did not treat the question of whether there are 
any natural slaves as an open question. This argument provides some 
evidence, but we still require more evidence. After all, any political 
theorist who wishes to advance a coherent normative account requires 
that certain facts should go their way (or that certain states of affairs 
should obtain), but that does not imply that she is not treating ques-
tions about whether the relevant states of affairs obtain as closed 
questions (i.e., questions that the theorist has already decided the 
answers to without a sincere examination of the relevant evidence). 
We require additional evidence if we are to establish that Aristotle’s 
account of natural slavery is ideological. In particular, we need to 
14 It should be noted that ancient Athens is classified as being one of only five genuine slave 
societies that have existed in world history. According to T. E. Rihll there are two factors that 
qualify a society to be a slave society rather than just a society with slaves: “the sheer number 
of slaves, relative to the population as a whole and the significance of the role slaves played 
in the society at issue, especially economically” (Rihll, 2011, 48).
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investigate whether Aristotle had access to evidence that would have 
obviously counted against his claims.
4. Aristotle’s Proto-Racialization of Natural Slavery
I think that the additional evidence that is required for establish-
ing that Aristotle’s account of natural slavery is ideological comes in 
the shape of what I will describe as Aristotle’s “proto-racialization” of 
natural slavery (i.e., his endorsement of the claim that all non-Greeks 
are natural slaves). It is one thing to claim that there are extremely 
infrequent cases when people are born who would be better off if 
they were enslaved (a claim which I think is false, but which does at 
least have some relative degree of plausibility, given the context within 
which Aristotle was working, when compared in any case to Aristotle’s 
claim that all non-Greeks are natural slaves), but Aristotle does not 
just make this claim; he goes on to make the claim that all non-Greeks 
are natural slaves (1252b4–8, 1285a19–21).15
It is here that the ideological character of Aristotle’s account is 
most apparent. For, as I have argued above, Aristotle could not coun-
tenance an answer to the question of whether there are any natural 
slaves that took the form: “yes, but this happens extremely rarely as a 
kind of aberration in nature.” Aristotle could not countenance such 
an answer because he needed a large population of people whose 
enslavement would be just, in order to provide the citizens of his 
polis  with sufficient leisure. For if Aristotle believed that his ideal polis 
needed roughly the same proportion of the population to be slaves 
as in his contemporary Athens, then he would have believed that he 
needed between 15% and 40% of the population to be slaves.16 I think 
15 I should note that this seems to be how Aristotle was interpreted by Plutarch. According to 
Plutarch, Alexander “did not follow Aristotle’s advice to treat Greeks as if he were their leader, 
and other peoples as if he were their master; to have regard for the Greeks as for friends 
and kindred, but to conduct himself towards other peoples as though they were plants or 
animals; for to do so would have been to cumber his leadership with numerous battles and 
banishments and festering seditions” (quoted from Isaac, 2004, 301). This interpretation 
of Aristotle’s advice was also shared by Eratosthenes, who is reported by Strabo as having 
written that “Alexander was advised to treat Greeks as friends and barbarians as enemies. 
This is silly, because some Greeks are bad and some barbarians civilized. . . . For this reason 
Alexander, ignoring the advice, received and favored all men of good repute” (quoted from 
Badian, 1958, 435).
16 The lowest modern estimate for the percentage of the population who were slaves in ancient 
Athens is 15% (which, according to this estimate, would still have been a slave society) while 
the highest modern estimate is 40% (Rihll, 2011).
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it is not at all unfair to say that had Aristotle examined the relevant 
evidence in an unbiased manner, an honest intellectual mistake would 
(at most) have led him to the answer that I have advanced above, 
but by no means can we say that an honest mistake in reasoning and 
the evaluation of evidence could have led him to conclude that all 
or most non-Greeks are natural slaves. I think that it is on this point 
that the ideological character of Aristotle’s account of natural slav-
ery becomes too obvious to ignore, especially when we consider that 
most of the slaves in Aristotle’s Athens were of non-Greek origin.17 
For in this case, Aristotle’s claim that non-Greeks are natural slaves 
is so clearly in contradiction with the empirical evidence that he had 
available to him that we are forced to explain it by resorting to the 
concept of ideology. For Aristotle is in effect claiming that (more or 
less) all non-Greeks lack rational foresight (i.e., the ability to engage 
in long-term planning). In fact, Aristotle contradicts himself on this 
issue throughout the Politics, for he does make frequent references 
(some of them rather positive) to the Carthaginians’ constitution 
(1272b25–30, 1273a20–30, 1273b8–10, 1320b4–5), and he does make 
a reference to Cyrus’ revolt against the Medes (1312a10–13). In fact, 
we should also note that Aristotle characterizes Cyrus as a king, i.e., 
one who rules for the sake of the common good, rather than as a 
tyrant (1310b35–38). Hence, in this sense he did implicitly concede 
that some non-Greeks were capable of some kind of deliberation 
(even ethical deliberation), and this seems to contradict (or at least 
is in tension with) Aristotle’s claim in Book I that for non-Greeks 
“their community consists of a male and a female slave” (1252b5–8). 
The point is that Aristotle sometimes slips into making claims to the 
effect that non-Greeks are capable of engaging in long-term planning 
and that they are able to organize themselves so as to create complex 
political, social and economic structures.
One objection that can be raised against describing Aristotle as 
engaging in a proto-racialization of slavery is that the concept of race 
is a modern concept, and that to bring it into this discussion repre-
sents a form of anachronism. For example, Oliver Cox has argued 
that “it may be demonstrated that racial antagonism, as we know it 
today, never existed in the world before about 1492; moreover, racial 
17 Millett has noted that “it is impossible to identify even a handful of Greeks as slaves in clas-
sical Athens” (Millett, 2007, 194).
G4712.indd   256 3/1/2019   2:16:06 PM
 ARISTOTLE ON SLAVERY 257
feeling developed concomitantly with the development of our modern 
[capitalist] social system” (Cox, 1959, xxx). However, I do not think 
that describing Aristotle as engaging in a proto-racialization of the 
category of the slave by nature contradicts the basic point that Oliver 
Cox was making. Immanuel Wallerstein, clearly influenced by Cox on 
this point, argues that “historical capitalism developed an ideologi-
cal framework of oppressive humiliation which had never previously 
existed, and which today we call sexism and racism” (Wallerstein, 1995, 
102). The reason he gives for this claim is that racism is quite different 
from xenophobia (fear of the stranger, which of course existed before 
capitalism). According to Wallerstein, “racism is that set of ideological 
statements combined with that set of continuing practices which have 
had the consequence of maintaining a high correlation of ethnicity 
and work-force allocation over time” (Wallerstein, 1995, 78). In fact, 
this definition of racism, far from being incompatible with the claim 
that Aristotle is engaged in a proto-racialization of natural slavery, 
justifies it. For in Aristotle’s account we have ideological claims (e.g., 
the claim that all non-Greeks are incapable of rational deliberation) 
that served to stabilize a socioeconomic system within which slave 
labor was correlated with ethnicity in a diachronic manner. Aristotle’s 
theory of natural slavery served to justify and stabilize the practices 
whereby people belonging to ethnic groups from Thrace and the Near 
East, where most slaves in Athens came from, were assigned the lowest 
status in the hierarchy of labor, namely that of slaves.18 
However, I think that the qualification “proto” is important 
because Aristotle was faced with a problem in terms of finding a 
suitable physiological marker by which to distinguish the members 
of ethnic groups that were marked for slavery from the members of 
ethnic groups purportedly marked for mastery. The problem was that 
Aristotle could not use the physiological marker that comes to mind 
when one thinks of slavery today, namely skin color. He could not 
do so because Greeks in the classical period were not significantly 
lighter in skin color than people belonging to ethnic groups from 
the Near East, and they were not significantly darker in skin color 
than people from Thrace. This means that Aristotle could not have 
a physiological marker that would be difficult to disguise. However, 
18 According to David Lewis most slaves in Classical Athens came from Asia Minor, the eastern 
Balkans (also known in the literature as the Black Sea regions), and (Greater) Syria (Lewis 
2011).
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it seems that if he had the chance to employ a physiological marker 
that could not be hidden easily or mistaken for a different marker, 
he would have employed it. Recall Aristotle’s claim that natural slaves 
have bodies that are suited for labor while individuals who should 
be masters have bodies that make them unable to engage in labor 
(1254b25–27). Of course, the idea of a body that marked itself out as 
the body of a master or a slave requires the existence of a very salient 
physiological marker, and the Europeans of the early modern period 
were able to find such a salient physiological marker in skin color. 
Hence, I do not take myself to be contradicting Oliver Cox’s claim 
that racism as we know it today did not exist before the late 15th to 
the early 16th centuries. However, I think that if we recognize that, 
in principle, skin color is not the only possible physiological marker 
that can be used, we can recognize that Aristotle’s account is much 
closer to modern racism than it is to xenophobia. Slaves from the 
Near East and Thrace were certainly not “strange” to Aristotle; they 
were part of his household.
Moreover, there is an additional explanatory benefit to describing 
Aristotle’s account of natural slavery as involving a “proto-racialization” 
of this category. It enables us to explain why, as Sylvia Wynter has 
noted, Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery, as taken up by the Scot-
tish philosopher John Mair, was essentially adopted wholesale by the 
jurists who attempted to establish the Spanish crown’s right to rule 
(and more specifically its right to despotic rule in Aristotle’s sense) 
over the “New World.” King Ferdinand’s jurists used Aristotle’s theory 
of natural slavery in order to argue that the indigenous peoples of the 
Americas were slaves by nature, and consequently that it was both just 
and beneficial for them that they be enslaved by the Spanish (Wynter, 
2003, 296). Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery played a crucial role 
in the development of the ideological apparatus that helped justify 
slavery in the “New World.” In fact, it seems that the only thing that 
prevented Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery from becoming a fully 
blown racialized account of slavery was the fact that Aristotle could 
not find a suitable, i.e., sufficiently salient and difficult-to-conceal, 
physiological mark that could be used to distinguish between those 
for whom slavery was just and those who should be masters. The 
justifiers of slavery in the 15th and 16th centuries were able to find 
a “suitable” physiological marker in skin color, and with Aristotle’s 
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theory of natural slavery in hand they were able to set the intellectual 
foundations of the ideology of early modern slavery.
We have seen above that Aristotle contradicts himself: on the one 
hand he wants to argue that non-Greeks lack the capacity to deliberate 
and that consequently their enslavement is both just and beneficial for 
them; on the other hand he sometimes slips into admitting that non-
Greeks have done and can do things that imply that they can engage in 
rational deliberation. Aristotle’s account seems to be self-contradictory 
in another respect. On the one hand, he claims that “because non-
Greeks are by nature more slavish in their character than Greeks, 
those in Asia being more so than those in Europe, they tolerate rule 
by a master without any complaint” (1285a19–21). Here, he seems to 
suggest that non-Greeks who live in Asia would make the best slaves 
(because they lack spirit, i.e., they have no desire to rule themselves). 
One therefore presumes that in the ideal polis  the slaves would be 
from Asia because they will be unlikely to agitate for freedom. Yet, in 
Book VII, Aristotle also claims that “it is better to hold out freedom as 
a reward to all slaves” (1330a32). Now, if Aristotle was serious about 
his depiction of the slavish or servile character of non-Greeks living in 
Asia, and if we assume that the slaves in the ideal polis would be from 
Asia (which is a plausible assumption, given Aristotle’s own assump-
tions), then it seems unlikely that there is any benefit (say, in terms of 
increased productivity) that can be derived from holding out freedom 
as a reward to such individuals, precisely because “they tolerate rule 
by a master without any complaint” (1285a19–21). This seems to show 
that Aristotle was not quite serious about his own characterization of 
the psychology of non-Greeks from Asia. So even if Aristotle suggests 
the promise of freedom as a kind of Machiavellian ploy, this suggestion 
presupposes that his own account of the psychology of those who are 
purportedly justly enslaved is not correct (i.e., that non-Greeks from 
Asia do indeed have some kind of yearning for freedom).
I suggest that this kind of inconsistency is exactly what one would 
expect from a theory that is ideological in character. I think one 
could argue that the very manner in which Aristotle seems to contra-
dict himself in the Politics (with regard to the claim that non-Greeks 
are natural slaves and what this implies) suggests that he was in the 
grip of an ideology. It is important to understand that one could be 
advancing ideological claims without realizing that this is what one 
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is doing. The idea that the factors that explain ideological construc-
tions are not the ones that the thinkers who produce the ideological 
constructions in question would identify as the explanation for their 
thought is clearly presented by Engels in a letter to Franz Mehring 
(dated July 14, 1893):
Ideology is a process which is, it is true, carried out consciously by what we 
call a thinker, but with a consciousness that is spurious. The actual motives 
by which he is impelled remain hidden from him, for otherwise it would not 
be an ideological process. Hence the motives he supposes himself to have 
are either spurious or illusory. . . . He works solely with conceptual material 
which he automatically assumes to have been engendered by thought without 
inquiring whether it might not have some more remote origin unconnected 
therewith. (Engels, 2004, 164.)
Consequently, to claim that Aristotle is advancing ideological claims 
does not necessarily amount to claiming that he was conscious that 
this is what he was doing, and perhaps this explains his carelessness. 
However, if Paul Cartledge (1993) is correct when he claims that by 
Aristotle’s time the inferiority of non-Greeks was a well-established 
belief on the popular level (though, as we shall see Aristotle had access 
to sources that challenged this belief), then Aristotle might not have 
expected any substantial resistance or pushback from whoever was 
the intended audience of the Politics. It is also interesting to note that 
Aristotle’s identification of non-Greeks with natural slaves seems to 
reflect the identification of slaves and non-Greeks in Athenian legal 
culture.19 To be sure, Aristotle does distinguish between slaves by law 
and natural slaves (1255a3–6), i.e., on Aristotle’s account one can 
occupy the legal position of a slave, but not be a natural slave, so that 
one’s enslavement would be unjust. However, since most of the slaves 
in Athenian society were non-Greeks, the potential critical power of 
Aristotle’s distinction is curtailed by his identification of non-Greeks 
with natural slaves. In short, as I have suggested above, the concept 
of ideology when it is applied with rigor and clarity, far from leading 
us to merely pass over Aristotle’s account of slavery or to treat it in a 
careless and dismissive manner, allows us to explain its logical structure 
(i.e., its inconsistency).
19 Robert Schlaifer notes that, in Athenian society, “the bases of the legal positions of the slave 
and the foreigner were the same” (Schlaifer, 1936, 181).
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5. The Absence of Aristotle’s Concept of Habit in His Account  
of the Differences Between Greeks and Non-Greeks
Perhaps we can gain additional insight into the ideological char-
acter of Aristotle’s approach to natural slavery by briefly examining 
the account that he gives of the differences between Greeks and non-
Greeks in Book VII, and his account of the causes of those differences. 
Aristotle discusses two groups of non-Greeks: the Northern Europeans, 
whom he characterizes as being “full of spirit but somewhat deficient in 
intelligence and craft knowledge” (1327b21–24), and the non-Greeks 
who live in Asia, whom he characterizes as having intelligence and craft 
knowledge while lacking spirit (1327b26–27).20 Aristotle claims that 
the Northern Europeans are relatively free, but apolitical (presumably 
because they are spirited but lacking in intelligence), while the non-
Greeks who live in Asia are “ruled and enslaved” (1327b26). Aristotle 
seems to want to attribute these differences to differences in climate. 
What is striking about this argument is that although Aristotle had the 
conceptual tools to attempt to account for the purported differences 
among different ethnic and cultural groups in terms of socialization 
and habits (i.e., in terms of the effects of political, social, and eco-
nomic structures), he does not even pretend to attempt to do this. 
Instead, he simply dehistoricizes and naturalizes these differences, a 
move which is common among those who advance ideological claims. 
I think that this point is especially important because Aristotle is a 
thinker who clearly recognized, in other contexts, the importance of 
habits and institutions in shaping human behavior; yet here he does 
not even attempt to apply this kind of nuanced social and behavioral 
analysis. I suggest that this kind of compartmentalization (the manner 
in which Aristotle accepts a mode of analysis that he might regard as 
being overly simplistic in other contexts) is further evidence of the 
ideological character of his account of natural slavery.
Jill Frank refers to this explanation of ethnic differences as a 
function of the effects of climate in order to argue that, for Aristotle, 
the distinction between those who are naturally free and those who 
are naturally unfree “rests on something other than a fixture of for-
eign psychology” (Frank, 2004, 102). Contrary to what Frank claims, 
20 Presumably he is referring to a limited intelligence that does not encompass high-level 
intellectual tasks.
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Aristotle never attempts to explain the (perceived) “natural slavish-
ness” of non-Greeks by referring to their habituation to tyrannical 
institutions (which is what he could have done). Instead, he seems to 
suggest consistently that non-Greeks are ruled by tyrants because they 
are naturally slavish and not the other way around.21 Frank claims that, 
for Aristotle, “there is nothing immutable that singles out any par-
ticular person as a slave. Instead, slave identity, like citizen identity, is 
determined by activity” (Frank, 2004, 95). However, Aristotle begins his 
discussion of the question of the existence of people who are natural 
slaves by noting that “some things are distinguished right from birth, 
some suited to rule and others to being ruled” (1254a20–22). Hence, 
I think it is highly implausible that Aristotle himself held that there is 
nothing immutable that renders individuals worthy of enslavement 
according to his account of natural slavery.
We should also note that Aristotle had access to a more nuanced 
approach, but did not attempt to employ it. We do know that Herodo-
tus emphasized the importance of custom and habit in shaping the 
behavior of different peoples, and that he emphasized the way these 
behaviors and characteristics change as different peoples come into 
contact with one another and as their social institutions develop 
(Rood, 2006, 302; Flower, 2006).
6. The Neglected Greek Critics of Natural Slavery
It is important to note that an ideological critique must treat the 
object of the critique (in this case Aristotle’s account of natural slavery) 
in its historical context. I have already mentioned Herodotus’ view as 
an alternative to Aristotle’s account of non-Greeks. It is significant for 
our purposes to note that some of Aristotle’s near-contemporaries as 
well as some of his contemporaries rejected the existence of natural 
slaves (i.e., they argued that slavery as such was unjustifiable). For 
instance, we know that the sophist Antiphon of Athens wrote the fol-
lowing in the late 5th century BCE: “By nature we are all constituted 
alike in all things, both barbarians and Greeks. This can be seen by 
21 When Aristotle claims that “because non-Greeks are by nature more slavish in their character 
than Greeks, those in Asia being more so than those in Europe, they tolerate rule by a master 
without any complaint”(1285a19 21), he is clearly attributing the (perceived) prevalence of 
tyranny in Asia to the “natural slavishness” of Asians, and not the other way around (contrary 
to Frank’s thesis).
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consideration of those things which are essential by nature to all 
men. . . . In these things no barbarian is set from us, nor any Greek” 
(quoted from Baldry, 1965, 44). It is clear that Antiphon’s claim that 
all human beings are constituted alike in all things implies a strong 
rejection of the possibility that there are natural slaves, in so far as 
natural slaves (on Aristotle’s account) suffer from some kind of innate 
(and apparently hereditary) psychological deficiency (i.e., the absence 
of the deliberative faculty). We also know that Philemon, a comic poet 
who was around one generation younger than Aristotle, is quoted as 
saying that “though a man be a slave he is made of the same flesh 
as you. For no one was ever made a slave by nature; but chance has 
enslaved a man’s body” (quoted from Westermann, 1955, 24).22 The 
question of whether Antiphon and Philemon believed what they said is 
irrelevant for my argument; I am only interested in showing that such 
views were in circulation and that Aristotle had alternatives before him.
Aristotle himself was aware of the existence of such attitudes 
towards slavery (1255a3, 1255a10), yet his approach towards these 
objections is rather muddled. It seems to me that if his intention was to 
refer to those who held views that were similar to the views expressed 
by Antiphon and Philemon, then his claim that their arguments “have 
neither force nor anything else to persuade us that one who is more 
virtuous should not rule or be master” (1255a20–21) is rather odd. 
First, it seems that the opponents of natural slavery held that no one 
was a slave by nature; however, to argue that no one is a slave by nature 
is quite different from arguing that even if there were people who 
could be accurately described as “natural slaves,” their enslavement 
would be unjust. Aristotle seems to think that he has side-stepped the 
main objection by arguing that the latter claim is false. He does not 
really respond to the direct challenge that was posed to his views by 
the likes of Antiphon (i.e., the claim that, as a matter of fact, there are 
no slaves by nature). Second, Aristotle seems to make a partial conces-
sion to the opponents of slavery when he concedes (in effect) that a 
rigid ethnic division (i.e., one that is hereditary in character) between 
non-Greek natural slaves and those who are naturally free (Greeks) 
cannot be maintained: “But often, though nature has a tendency to 
bring this about [i.e., to have natural slaves be born to natural slaves 
22 The sophist Alcidamas is also quoted as saying that “God has left all men free; nature has 
made no man a slave” (quoted from Baldry, 1965, 60).
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and to have naturally free individuals be born to naturally free indi-
viduals], it is nevertheless unable to do so” (1255b1–3).23 Note that 
Aristotle still wants to maintain that “nature has a tendency to bring 
this about,” for he clearly wants to claim that the division between 
natural slaves and those who are naturally free is really a proto-racial 
division. Yet we should note that to say that nature has a tendency to 
bring about something, but that this tendency is often thwarted, seems 
to be incoherent, given Aristotle’s own conception of what it is for 
something to be natural. For in his Parts of Animals, Aristotle makes the 
following claim: “In all our speculations concerning nature, what we 
have to consider is the general rule; for that is natural which applies 
either universally or for the most part” (663b27–29). So, we can ask 
how is it that Aristotle is able to identify a tendency of nature that is 
not even actualized in the majority of cases (i.e., how can Aristotle 
describe this as something natural)? Aristotle in attempting to defend 
his theory of natural slavery ends up contradicting a key tenet of his 
philosophy of nature. The general point is that Aristotle’s engagement 
with the opponents of natural slavery is rather superficial. Certainly, we 
cannot plausibly believe that this is the best that someone of Aristotle’s 
exceptional intelligence could have done in terms of presenting and 
responding to their arguments, had he been interested in seriously 
engaging with those arguments. This serves to corroborate my claim 
that Aristotle is not treating the question of whether there are any 
natural slaves as an open question and that his account is largely 
ideological in character.
7. Conclusion
When we consider all of the relevant evidence, it is difficult to 
avoid concluding that Aristotle’s account of natural slavery is largely 
ideological, in the sense that it is comprised of claims that are so 
obviously false, relative to the evidence that he had available to him, 
that we can only explain how someone as intelligent as he could have 
held them by appealing to their function in upholding the perceived 
interests of slave-owning Greeks and the Greeks’ image of themselves 
as being inherently superior to non-Greeks. The contemporaries of 
23 This point is also made by Cambiano (1987), but he emphasizes Aristotle’s discussion of 
physical differences between natural slaves and those who are naturally free (1254b25–36), 
whereas, I think the issue is clearer in the passage that I have cited.
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Aristotle who believed that there was no such thing as natural slavery 
and that all slavery was unjust were challenging an entire form of life, 
for to make such a claim in a slave society is to claim that one’s soci-
ety is fundamentally characterized by injustice (of course, calling for 
abolition is a different matter entirely). Hence, in rejecting this view, 
Aristotle was also rejecting a chance to offer a radical moral critique 
of contemporary Athenian society. In the final analysis, I think that 
Aristotle’s account of natural slavery was motivated by an attempt to 
defend slavery as it was actually practiced in contemporary Athens 
(and in the Greek world in general). To be sure, Aristotle’s account 
of the sort of slavery that can be justified (i.e., “natural slavery”) could, 
in principle, have been used to criticize the practice of slavery as it 
existed (e.g., by denying that most of those who were enslaved are 
natural slaves). However, by equating non-Greeks with natural slaves, 
Aristotle made it extremely unlikely that it would be used in this 
manner, and he must have been aware of the fact that most of his 
contemporaries believed that non-Greeks were innately inferior to 
Greeks, just as he must have been aware of the fact that most slaves 
were non-Greeks. As I have emphasized throughout this discussion, 
when we consider Aristotle’s account of natural slavery in light of his 
equation between non-Greeks and natural slaves, it becomes clear that 
it is largely ideological in character. It seems to me that Aristotle could 
not bring himself to admit that his society was structurally unjust, and 
so he ended up defending the indefensible. Nonetheless, it should 
be clear that my purpose in writing this paper is not to gloat over 
Aristotle’s failings. If there is any lesson to be derived from analyzing 
his account of natural slavery, it is the importance of recognizing 
that the moral and political claims which appear to us as the prod-
ucts of reasoned philosophical reflection may in fact be ideological 
in nature.24 To observe how a philosopher who was as intelligent as 
Aristotle was unable to emancipate himself from the prejudices of 
his culture, ethnic group, and socioeconomic class is an exercise in 
humility which should be translated into an effort to understand the 
social determinants of philosophical thought. This involves taking 
24 Marx makes a similar point in a passing reference to Aristotle’s account of slave labor in 
the opening chapter on the commodity form in Volume I of Capital: “If a giant thinker like 
Aristotle could err in his evaluation of slave-labor, why should a dwarf economist like Bastiat 
be right in his evaluation of wage-labor?” (Marx, 1976, 175, n35).
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potential applications of the Marxist concept of ideology seriously in 
the study of the history of philosophy.
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